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Legal Positivism and Originalist Interpretation

The topic I have been assigned for this keynote address is the relationship between legal

positivism and originalist theories of interpretation. Fortunately for me, there is indeed a

relationship between these two things, and a strong one at that. Or so I shall contend.

My plan is as follows: I shall first give an account of legal positivism. That account will

be brief, no more than a sketch, but hopefully not a caricature. But it will be sufficient for

demonstrating the relationship between legal positivism and originalist interpretation.

After my brief portrayal of legal positivism, I shall turn my attention to originalist

interpretation. I shall show why legal positivism supports originalism. And I shall conclude by

discussing various objections to originalism, objections that nevertheless can be successfully

parried.

I. Legal Positivism

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2691740

Legal positivism is a family of theories about the nature of law. If I were to characterize

the common element in these theories, the element that makes them all legal positivist, it would

be that all regard law as at least in part a human artefact. Indeed, it is because law is at least in

part a human artefact that provides support for the positivists’ claim that a norm can be law even

if it is morally infelicitous. For because human beings are fallible “crooked timber,” the norms

they construct, even if with the best intentions, will deviate from what morality would dictate.

Now there are many versions of legal positivism on offer. There is John Austin’s

version: law consists of the commands of the sovereign, he, she, or they who are habitually
obeyed. 1 There is Hans Kelsen’s version: law is the set of norms instructing officials when to
apply sanctions, norms that are rendered valid by an assumed “grundnorm.” 2 There is H.L.A.

Hart’s version: law is the set of norms generally obeyed and rendered valid by the rule of
recognition, a master norm accepted by officials as obligatory. 3 There is Joseph Raz’s version:

law is the set of norms that are generally obeyed and that are the product of authorities, those

whose determination of our obligations purport to be preemptive of the reasons on which they

1

JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1961).
3
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
2
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are based. 4 And there is Scott Shapiro’s version: law is the set of norms that represent the plans
of those who have the authority to plan for us and settle what we are obligated to do. 5 And these

are not the only versions of legal positivism in the literature.

Moreover, these versions of legal positivism fall into two warring camps. Some

versions—Raz’s and Shapiro’s, for example—are in the camp of exclusive legal positivism.

Those in that camp believe that law consists entirely of social facts—what some human beings

did—and in no part of moral considerations. To the extent that a legal norm purports to

incorporate moral considerations, the latter are not part of the law. They are like references in

the law to foreign law, or to mathematics, or to some other set of norms. The norms referenced

are not constitutive of the law but are external to it.

The other warring camp, the inclusive legal positivists, is probably the more numerous

one among legal philosophers today. The inclusive legal positivists believe that moral norms can

be at least among the determinants of the law and thus that social facts need not be the only

determinants of law.

4
5

JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979).
SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011).
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Finally, there are those like me who believe the division between exclusive and inclusive
legal positivism to be merely terminological and without theoretical significance. 6 What is

significant is that all legal positivists regard law as necessarily a human artefact, at least in part.

Legal norms are posited by human beings, those with the authority to do so. And therein lies the

connection between legal positivism as an account of the nature of law and originalism as an

account of the interpretation of legal norms. And it is to originalism that I now turn.

II. Originalism and Legal Positivism: The Basic Connection

If law is a human artefact, and if legal norms are posited by those persons with the

authority to do so, as legal positivism would have it, then it follows that the job of those who

must interpret the texts promulgated by the authorities—texts meant to convey the norms the

authorities have chosen—is to discover just what norms those texts convey. And it follows that

the interpreters’ job is to seek the authorially-intended meanings of the legal texts. For the

authorially-intended meanings just are the norms chosen by the authorities, those who are

6

See Larry Alexander, “Was Dworkin an Originalist?,” in THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN (W. Waluchow and
S. Sciaraffa eds., forthcoming).

4

authorized to choose the governing norms. And seeking authorially-intended meanings of texts

is what originalism is.

So originalism is nothing more than the corollary of the legal positivist’s claim that law

consists of norms chosen by human authorities. And those norms are the uptake the authorities

intend in their audience when they promulgate those norms in texts, whether in writing, orally,

through semaphore, or through smoke signals. Originalism and legal positivism are thus a

package deal.

III. Two Versions of Originalism?

I have identified originalism with seeking the authorially-intended meanings of legal

texts. But haven’t I neglected what is currently probably the most popular version of

originalism, namely, that which identifies it with the search for the original public meaning of
legal texts? 7 The latter view is originalist insofar as it claims that the public meaning of legal

7

See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, “What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory,” in THE
CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM (G. Huscroft and B.W. Miller eds., 2011) 12-41, 22-23.

5

texts is fixed at the time those texts are promulgated—what Larry Solum, a proponent of the
original public meaning view, calls the “fixation thesis.” 8

The original public meaning view of originalism asks the interpreter of legal texts to seek

the meaning that a reasonable member of the public at the time of the text’s promulgation would

have given the text. The interpreter is not to seek the authorially-intended meaning. There are

two basic rationales the proponents of this version of originalism give for preferring it to the

authorially-intended meaning version of originalism. One rationale is that the original public

meaning view avoids the problem of discovering that a law means something other than what

most people thinks it means. The other rationale is that the original public meaning view avoids

the aggregation problem, the problem posed by legal texts whose authors, who are multiple, have

different intended meanings.

But original public meaning does not avoid either of those problems. The reasonable

person, who is the artificial touchstone of original public meaning interpretation, may not come

up with a single unique interpretation. Every construction of this fictitious person, attributing to

him or her different degrees of knowledge of the meaning the actual authors of the legal texts
8

Id. at 33.

6

intended, will produce different interpretations. Two reasonable contemporaries, each possessed

of different information, may interpret the same legal text differently. And each will presumably

be seeking the authorially-intended meaning of that text. (They wouldn’t be seeking their own

meaning.) But if that is the case, why not seek the authorially-intended meaning rather than what

some fictitious persons seeking that meaning would have concluded it was, especially if such

persons, differently situated, would have come up with different meanings? And even if some

people would have been surprised by that meaning in such a way as to make it unfair to hold

them to it, the unfairness can be handled by methods that do not require denying that the norm
truly means what its authors intended it to mean. 9

With respect to the aggregation problem, which is a real problem, original public

meaning versions of originalism are impotent. The reasonable person, who again is the

touchstone of original public meaning, will be seeking the authorially-intended meaning but will

also be aware of the aggregation problem; and if the aggregation problem sinks authorially-

intended meaning originalism, it will also sink original public meaning originalism.

9

See, e.g., Larry Alexander, “Originalism, the Why and the What,” 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 541-42 (2013); Larry
Alexander, “Simple-Minded Originalism,” in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 7, 87-98, at 90-91.
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Thus far, then, the problems of recondite meaning and aggregation attributed to

authorially-intended meaning originalism are not avoided by but are inherited by original public

meaning originalism. But there is one final problem with original public meaning originalism, a

problem that does not plague authorially-intended meaning originalism. That is the problem of

mindless law-making. According to original public meaning originalism, the law that authorities

intend to make may not be the law they end up making. That is because, if original public

meaning originalism is to distinguish itself from authorially-intended meaning originalism, the

laws that the original public meaning folks will claim to have been promulgated can theoretically

differ from the laws the authorities intended to promulgate. Laws will be human creations, but

they will not be laws any humans intended to create. They will be mindless creations. And any

theory of legal interpretation that contemplates mindless, accidental law creation is a theory that

has a serious burden to overcome. If such a theory is to succeed, it must show that the number

of mistakes it produces—mistakes defined as the divergence between the laws actually intended

and the laws the interpretive theory produces—are fewer than the mistakes produced by directly

seeking the authorially-intended laws. That original public meaning theories can meet this

burden cannot be ruled out a priori. Nonetheless, I remain doubtful that original public meaning
8

theories can succeed. Thus, from here on the version of originalism that I claim to be a

corollary of legal positivism is the authorially-intended meaning version.

IV. Of Rules, Standards, Principles, and Concepts

If, according to legal positivists, legal norms are human creations, just what kinds of legal

norms can humans create? I contend that there are only two kinds: rules and standards. Rules

are rather determinate norms, or at least they are norms that require no moral or other practical

reasoning to apply. (They may require complex factual or mathematical reasoning, however, so

long as the required epistemology is not itself controversial.) In other words, whatever their

differences in values, all can understand what the rule requires. A stop sign or a numerical speed

limit is a good example of a rule.

Standards, on the other hand, are norms that do require moral or other practical reason to

apply. As I sometimes put it, a standard is a norm that requires for its application that its

audience do the right thing, morally or prudentially, within the constraints set by rules. (When

the standard instructs its audience to consider only certain factors, that is tantamount to a rule

instructing them to treat all other relevant factors as cancelling each other out and thus incapable

9

of determining the outcome.) “Drive reasonably” and “pay your fair share in taxes” would be

good examples of standards. People with different values would apply such standards

differently.

So far, what I have said—that legal norms consist of rules and standards—is

commonplace. Moreover, insofar as interpretation is concerned, rules require interpretation but

standards require practical reasoning, not interpretation. What interpretation seeks are

authorially-intended meanings, and the deliverances of practical reasoning are independent of

such meanings. Interpretation itself ends when the interpreter discovers that the authors intended

to promulgate a standard.

Notice that I have limited legal norms to rules and standards. I have not mentioned legal

principles, norms that are human creations but which have the dimension of weight. Rules either

apply or do not apply. If the former, then their “weight,” at least within the legal system, is

infinite. If the latter, their weight is zero. And standards may require consulting external values

that have the dimension of weight; but those values and their weights are not themselves human

creations.

10

Some legal theorists, however, believe there are distinctly legal principles, human

creations that have weight that is neither infinite nor zero. Robert Alexy, for example, believes
that legal principles, as I have described them, can be directly enacted. 10 Ronald Dworkin

believes that legal principles are created indirectly. They are the most morally acceptable
principles that “fit” with the legal rules and legal decisions. 11

I have argued elsewhere that legal principles do not exist.12 Principles with weight

cannot be humanly created. Nor can they be created indirectly in the way Dworkin contends.

Weight, which is the dimension that will govern whether or not the principle will determine the

outcomes of an indefinite number of possible cases, cannot be created. Nor can a finite body of

legal rules and decisions create such weight. Complex rules, with conditions and exceptions, can

mimic weight, but they are but a series of on-off switches between infinite and zero. Moral

principles with weights may exist, but legal principles do not.

10

See Larry Alexander, “Legal Objectivity and the Illusion of Legal Principles,” in INSTITUTIONALIZED REASON:
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ROBERT ALEXY (M. Klatt ed., 2012), 115-31.
11
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
12
See Larry Alexander, “The Objectivity of Morality, Rules, and Law: A Conceptual Map,” 65 ALABAMA L. REV.
501 (2013); Alexander, supra note 10; Larry Alexander and Kenneth Kress, “Against Legal Principles,” in LAW
AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (A. Marmor ed., 1995), 279-327.
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Dworkin at times also claims that some legal norms contain words that refer to moral
concepts, words such as “cruelty,” “equality,” and “freedom of speech.” 13 I claim, however, that

unless morality itself contains joints that correspond to such words in legal norms, so that it is

possible that such words have moral referents, then, contra Dworkin, those words must refer to
their authors’ particular conceptions, the authors’ criteria for the words’ applications. 14 And note

that one consequence of deeming such words to refer to principles in the moral ontological

cupboard, aside from the worry whether morality has distinct principles that correspond with the

words that are meant to refer to those principles, is that the final authority within the legal

system, such as the Supreme Court, will have the final say over what morality really does
require—at least within the legal system. 15 Only by the Court’s reversing itself, by constitutional

amendment, or by revolution can the people escape from being ruled by moral principles that

they do not believe exist or have a different shape and weight than what the Court has decreed.

Finally, I should say a word about morally freighted language in legal regimes, such as,

for example, Canada’s, that officially renounce originalism. The Canadian Supreme Court, for
13

See Ronald Dworkin, “Comment,” in A. SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997), 115-27.
14
See Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, “Law’s Limited Domain Confronts Morality’s Universal Empire,” 48
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1599-1601 (2007).
15
Id. at 1595-96.
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example, has denied that it should interpret the words of the Charter based on what those who
adopted it may have meant by those words. 16 To repeat an earlier point, however, words are

only words, and words in a particular language or idiolect, rather than mere marks or sounds, if

they were produced by an author or authors intending to communicate something thereby to an

audience. By disregarding authorially-intended meaning, the Canadian courts are essentially

appropriating the marks on the page to author their preferred meanings—much as a kidnapper,

who cuts out words and phrases from a magazine to fashion a ransom note, appropriates others’

marks in order to convey his own meanings. And the Canadian courts are undoubtedly

concerned that their meanings in their opinions be followed by those over whom they have

authority rather than treated as the Canadian courts treat the words of the Charter’s authors.

My conclusion then is that legal norms are either rules or standards. Standards are not

norms that are interpreted. They call for the application of practical reason, not for deciphering

linguistic expressions. Rules, on the other hand, are legal norms that must be interpreted. They

are human creations that mean what their creators intended them to mean. Attributing any other

meaning to them is to take the symbols employed by the authors and in a sense reauthor them
16

See Larry Alexander, “Of Living Trees and Dead Hands: The Interpretation of Constitutions and Constitutional
Rights,” 22 CANADIAN J. OF L. & JURISP. 227 (2009).
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and give them a new meaning. The authors’ symbols—the marks or sounds (or flags or

smoke)—may remain the same, but the “texts” those symbols create be different. And the

relevant question will be who had the requisite authority to create the legal norms, the original

authors or the persons who have proclaimed the original authors’ symbols to mean something

other than what they intended them to mean?

V. Problems

I have now made the case for the relation between legal positivism—the view that law is

a human creation—and originalism, the view that symbols mean what those employing them

intend them to mean. The case is, I believe, relatively straightforward. Why then is it so often

and vehemently resisted? In this section I shall take up a variety of problems that might affect

originalism, some of which flag real concerns, but none of which is either fatal or shows the

appeal of some opposing view.

1. The Kripkenstein Problem

I will be brief here. The so-called Kripkenstein problem refers to Sol Kripke’s

elaboration of a puzzle raised by Wittgenstein, namely, how can we know whether we are
14

properly following a rule. 17 Kripke’s elaboration uses the example of addition: how can

someone who has never added two particular numbers—in Kripke’s example, 67 and 58—know

that the rule of addition has been “plus,” which would produce the answer 125, rather than

“quus,” which would produce the answer, 125 up to now but now 5? Because the person has

never added 67 and 58 before, what makes it the case that the rule of addition he has been

following has been plus rather than quus? And as applied to interpretation, the problem would

be, what makes it the case that at the time the author intends a meaning, that meaning properly

extends to cases that were not present in his mind at the time he intended the meaning? If, for

example, he intended to ban pets from restaurants, what makes it the case that “pets” refers to my

pet German Shepherd, which the author knew nothing of, rather than to dogs other than my

German Shepherd? After all, nothing in the finite contents of his mind at the time he authored

the intended ban would seem to make it the case that it did or did not include my dog.

There is a vast literature on the Kripkenstein problem and its possible solutions. 18 What

is important is that neither Wittgenstein, Kripke, nor their commentators are skeptics about rules

17

See LARRY ALEXANDER AND EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING (2008), 160-65; LARRY
ALEXANDER AND EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES (2001), 112-14.
18
See, e.g., the authorities cited in DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 161 n. 69.

15

and rule-following, whether they are the rules of mathematics or the rules we create through our

intentions. We can be certain that we know how to add numbers we have never before added.

And likewise, we can be certain about whether we did or did not intend to ban particular dogs in

restaurants even if we did not know of or contemplate those particular dogs at the time we

authored the ban. There will be occasions when we are not certain—more on that possibility in

the next section—but in general we will not be plagued by Kripkenstein doubts. In short, there is

no reason to doubt the existence of intended meanings that are beyond the particular contents of

the mind of the author of those meanings at the time of authorship.

2. The Infelicitous Result Problem

Suppose the authorially-intended meaning of a legal rule leads to what interpreter

believes are infelicitous results. Indeed, suppose the interpreter believes that the authority or

authorities who promulgated the legal rule would themselves regard its results as infelicitous.

Should that lead the interpreter to believe that the intended meaning of the rule is other than it

appears to be? In general, the answer is “no.”

16

The relation between the authorially-intended meaning and infelicitous results can take

four forms. First, the authors might say, we agree our rule leads to these infelicitous results, and

we regret intending the meaning that leads to those results. We simply made a mistake and

authored a bad legal norm. This problem is the banal problem of bad law, a problem legal

positivism surely contemplates and in a sense embraces.

Second, the authors might say, yes, these results are infelicitous, but we knew our rule,

like all rules, would be over and under-inclusive and that therefore would lead to infelicitous

results in some cases. But we still believe that having a rule rather than a standard is on balance

preferable despite occasional infelicitous results, such as those here. This problem is the
problem of rules, a problem that is well known. 19 But it is not a problem that undermines the

proposition that rules can be on balance beneficial, much less undermines the possibility of their

existence.

Third, the authors might say, these results are so terrible that it is absurd to assume that
our intended meaning produces them. 20 If we had said “no vehicles in the park,” would anyone

19
20

See ALEXANDER AND SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES, supra note 17, at ch. 4.
Id. at 249 n. 63; ALEXANDER AND SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 168-70.
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really assume we meant to exclude emergency vehicles, such as ambulances, even if we made no

specific exception for them? Or if we had said “no cell phone use in the library,” would anyone

really assume we meant the ban to cover reports of a violent crime or a fire, even if we made no

specific exceptions for such uses? Our intended meanings often extend beyond and sometimes
fall short of what we literally say. 21 This problem is merely a problem endemic to interpreting

language use.

Fourth, there will be some cases where the author will say, I do not know whether my
intended meaning covers this case, whether or not the result it would produce is infelicitous. 22 In

other words, I am not sure what I intended with respect to this kind of case. Once again, this

problem is one endemic to interpreting language use.

3. The Aggregation Problem

This problem is the one most often raised against legal interpretation based on

authorially-intended meanings. For many legal norms are the product of multi-member bodies—

legislatures, constitutional conventions, panels of judges or administrators, and so forth. And if

21
22

See RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012), ch. 7.
See ALEXANDER AND SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES, supra note 17, at 118.
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one denies the existence of group minds, then the norms those bodies promulgate have many

authors, not just one. And how do we determine the authorially-intended meaning of a text that

has several authors?

One answer, the one Richard Kay and I favor, is to look for a shared intended meaning, a
meaning intended by at least the number of legislators required to enact the law. 23 In many

instances, a shared intended meaning will exist. When my wife and I created a trust document to

deal with our assets and their distribution, the meanings we each intended to be expressed by that

document were, I believe, the same meanings. They were shared intended meanings. So, too, I

believe, are the intended meanings expressed in the academic rules enacted by my faculty. And

if just married couples and law faculties can have shared intended meanings, so too can

legislatures, panels of judges, and other multi-member legal authorities.

On the other hand, if there is no intended-meaning shared by the number of legislators

required to enact legal norms, then the texts they promulgate are, for purposes of expressing

23

See ALEXANDER AND SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 171-73, 182-85.

19

valid legal norms, meaningless. They are gibberish. 24 No norm was enacted and expressed

through them.

Now some originalists wish to avoid this conclusion at all costs. That explains the

attraction of the original public meaning version, as I said when I discussed that version in

section III. There, I expressed my doubts that original public meaning originalism, which relies

on a construct, the reasonable member of the public at the time of the enactment, who in turn is

seeking the original authorially-intended meaning, could improve upon authorially-intended

meaning originalism. Some proponents of original public meaning originalism believe that it can

avoid the aggregation problem of authorially-intended meaning originalism. As I said in section

III., I do not believe that it can. So let me give an example of a failure of shared meaning that

cannot be avoided by original public meaning.

Suppose a three-person legislature enacts a rule banning X by a two to one vote. X is

ambiguous and can mean either A or B, which are exclusive of each other. Legislator 1 intends

by X to mean A and would have voted against the rule if X meant B. Legislator 2 intends by X

24

Id.

20

to mean B and would have voted against the rule if X had meant A. Legislator 3 voted against

the rule and would have voted against it regardless of whether X meant A or meant B.

Now suppose our construct, the reasonable person at the time of the enactment, knows

this. What meaning would he or she think X means? Of course, if we stipulate that the

reasonable person knows X can mean A but does not know X can also mean B—or vice versa—

then the reasonable person will believe X means A (or B). But such a stipulation is completely

arbitrary. And furthermore, as I said in section III., proceeding that way produces a law—in this

case, a ban on A—that was not intended by the body with the authority to make law. It was

produced by only one member of a three member legislature that is authorized to make law only

by a majority vote. And although a majority voted in favor of banning X, a majority did not vote

in favor of banning A. The latter ban was produce by an arbitrary stipulation. It is an example

mindless law creation.

Now some critics of the authorially-intended meaning version of originalism and

proponents of the original public meaning version are not put off by this degree of mindlessness.

They believe that some background rules of interpretation can produce law in cases in which the

21

authorially-intended meaning approach produces gibberish. 25 Such rules might be instruction

such as “when a word has multiple meanings, choose the first meaning of it listed in such-and-

such dictionary.” If these rules can handle all the cases of failed aggregation of authorially-

intended meaning, then even though the laws they produce will be partially the result of a

mindless process, such laws may still be preferable to having legislators fail to enact laws and

instead enact gibberish. For if the legislators know that these rules will operate on their texts,

presumably they will take care to see that the rules produce the meanings that they intend. There

will be more cases of mindful law than would be enacted without those rules, when the

alternative to mindful law is gibberish. Such background rules can, it is argued, bring a good

deal of convergence of authorially-intended meanings and meanings the background rules

produce. They cannot eliminate the gap between the mindful and the mindless, but they can

narrow it.

Ultimately, whether reliance on background rules will produce enough convergence

between mindful law creation and mindless law creation is, like all rule-consequentialist

prescriptions, an empirical matter, as is whether the mindless laws that remain are better than or

25

See, e.g., ALEXANDER AND SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING, supra note 17, at 173-85.
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worse than sticking solely with the search for authorially-intended meanings and the possibility

of finding gibberish. It also depends on there being a determinate set of background rules,

moreover background rules of which legislators are aware and understand. I cannot say these

things are impossible, although I admit to being skeptical.

VI. Conclusion

In concluding, I can be brief. Legal positivism views law as a human creation. It is

created by those who have the authority to create it. Originalism has it that texts are only texts

and not marks, sounds, smoke, flags, or some other mute item when those marks, sounds, or

other items are used by an author or authors to convey the authors’ intended meaning to an

audience. When the authors are those with the authority to create laws, and the authors are

intending by their texts to create laws and communicate their content to the relevant audience,

then it seems natural to assume that the laws mean what their authors intended them to mean.

Legal positivism and originalism go together and cannot be pried apart.

23
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